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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF THE HOMELESS
ELIZABETH SCHUTZ
INTRODUCTION
Calculations of the number of homeless people in the United States
range from 250,000 or 350,0001 up to 3 or 4 million.' While there might
be debate regarding the exact number of the homeless population, few
would disagree that the homeless problem has reached crisis proportions.
During the period from 1988 to 1989 alone, the number of homeless in-
creased by an average of eighteen percent across forty-six cities surveyed
by the Partnership for the Homeless. 3 Moreover, the 1990 United States
Conference of Mayors found that requests for emergency shelter in cities
across America increased an average of twenty-four percent in 1990.'
Although the number of emergency and transitional shelter beds for
the homeless has increased in most of the cities surveyed, these increases
have not nearly met the demand.' On average, the cities surveyed in
1989 by the Partnership for the Homeless were unable to meet the needs
for shelter for thirty-seven percent of their homeless populations.6 And,
while eighty percent of the cities and localities surveyed expected an in-
crease in the number of homeless, only one-half expected to increase
their emergency shelter or transitional accommodations.'
The living accommodations of the homeless cover a wide spectrum of
situations, ranging from shelters to public buildings (including train or
bus stations, airports, and building lobbies) and abandoned structures."
Many homeless people live outdoors in public areas such as sidewalks,
1. These are estimates from a 1984 study by the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development ("HUD"). See J. Kozol, Rachel and Her Children 9 (1988); Home-
lessness in the United States: Background and Federal Response-A Briefing Paper For
Congressional Candidates, Practising Law Institute, Dec. 1, 1988, available in Westlaw,
PLI Database, at *2 n.1 [hereinafter Briefing Paper]. The Reagan Administration com-
missioned this study in response to estimates by several different organizations that the
homeless population had reached nearly 3 million. See Briefing Paper, supra, at 12 n. 1.
This estimate was later discredited by a House subcommittee that found that the method-
ology was flawed and that HUD intentionally attempted to keep these numbers low. See
id.; J. Kozol, supra, at 9.
2. This is the estimate by Coalition for the Homeless, an advocacy group. See J.
Kozol, supra note 1, at 9; Briefing Paper, supra note 1, at 2 n. 1; National Coalition for the
Homeless, Homelessness in America: A Summary I [hereinafter National Coalition].
3. See Partnership for the Homeless, Moving Forward. A Status Report on Homeless-
ness in America 4 (1989) [hereinafter Moving Forward]. The survey found that a lack of
affordable housing for low-income households was the primary cause of homelessness for
60% of those surveyed. See id at 18; National Coalition, supra note 2, at 2.
4. See U.S. Conference of Mayors News Conference, Fed. News Serv., Dec. 19, 1990,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Majpap file [hereinafter US Conference].
5. See Moving Forward, supra note 3, at 14.
6. See id In 1988 and 1989, this percentage reached as high as 90% in Dallas and
80% in Chicago. See id
7. See id at 19.
8. See P. Rossi, Down and Out in America 88 (1989).
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parks, under bridges and viaducts.9 Some live alone, while others live in
homeless communities or encampments of makeshift homes.'" Congre-
gating in such groups helps the homeless protect their persons and their
belongings."I Moreover, these makeshift encampments often function as
microcosms of traditional communities because the inhabitants are ex-
pected to abide by certain rules and to respect the privacy of each other's
"homes."' 2 Indeed, because the homeless often feel safer in their own
makeshift communities, many prefer these encampments to government-
sponsored shelters.' 3
Official treatment of the homeless often differs substantially from ac-
tual treatment of the homeless. For instance, some localities have en-
acted ordinances that prohibit sleeping outdoors in public places.14 Such
laws are directed primarily at the homeless and are designed to drive
them out of those municipalities.' 5 Moreover, while local authorities in
some communities almost never tolerate the presence of makeshift homes
of the homeless' 6 and have enacted laws to prevent the homeless from
camping out in certain areas, makeshift encampments are nonetheless
tolerated by the police in some locales.' 7 In some cities, tolerance of the
9. See id.
10. See, e.g., Morgan, In the Shadow of Skyscrapers Grows a Shantytown Society, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1991, at A1, col. 2 (noting that dozens of homeless encampments exist in
New York City); Toth, N. Y City's 'Mole People' Shun Society in Transit Tunnels, L.A.
Times, Sept. 2, 1990, at Al, col. 1 (describing homeless 'mole people' who live in commu-
nities in underground subway tunnels); Swartz, Hard-Luck Life in Hobo Jungle, L.A.
Times, July 15, 1990, at BI, col. 2 (discussing makeshift camp along Ventura River bot-
tom known as "Hobo Jungle"); McDonnell, Migrant Camp Rising Again From Ashes of
Disastrous Fire, L.A. Times, Dec. 26, 1989, at A3, col. I (reporting on encampment of
migrant workers squatting on private land); Sahagun, 'River-Bottom' People: Dirt, De-
bate, Dilemma, L.A. Times, Oct. 6, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. I (reporting on 17 homeless men
and women who live in makeshift community on the banks of the Santa Ana River).
11. See Ades, The Unconstitutionality of "Antihomeless" Laws: Ordinances Prohibit-
ing Sleeping in Outdoor Public Places as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 Calif. L.
Rev. 595, 599 (1989).
12. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 10, at A28, col. 1 (reporting that the homeless make
their own rules at campsites, including no stealing or drugs); Sahagun, supra note 10, § 1,
at 3, col. 1 (noting that the homeless community has "formed a self-governing tribe" by
voting and performing guard duty).
13. See Morgan, supra note 10, at Al col. 2.
14. See Ades, supra note 11, at 595-96 & nn.5-10; Oreskes and Toner, The Homeless
at the Heart of Poverty and Policy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1989, § V, at 5, col. I.
15. See Ades, supra note 11, at 596.
16. See Kurtzman, City to Keep Destroying Property, L.A. Times, July 2, 1988, § 11, at
1, col. 5 (describing the Mayor of Santa Ana's vows to keep destroying the makeshift
homes of the homeless).
17. See, e.g., Sahagun, supra note 10, § 1, at 3, col. I (noting that the police and
County Sheriff's Department had taken a "hands-off approach" to the makeshift en-
campment of the "river-bottom" people); Bowman, Homelessness in a County of Big
Homes, San Fran. Chron., Oct. 19, 1990, at A30, col. 1 (reporting that police tolerate a
homeless encampment in San Rafael because the inhabitants "have not caused any
problems"); Greene, Squatters Break into Sunnydale Apartments, San Fran. Chron., Nov.
13, 1989, at A3, col. I (reporting San Francisco police do not take action against home-
less squatters in vacant apartments).
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homeless depends on the area in which the homeless encampments are
located,"8 and often the authorities act to remove these encampments
only after years of toleration.' 9 Other municipalities have gone so far as
to sanction homeless encampments.' Finally, even in areas where the
local authorities enforce a policy of tearing down encampments, the in-
habitants of homeless communities are often able to hide their existence
for years.21
The growing homeless population in America has given rise to a
heightened awareness of the legal issues that face the homeless in particu-
lar-issues that have previously been unanticipated or ignored. For in-
stance, police sweeps of homeless encampments have led at least one
commentator to argue that the fourth amendment right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures is implicated by these sweeps,'
although as yet courts have decided only a few cases involving the fourth
amendment rights of the homeless.23 In addition, a recent case involving
18. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 10, at Al, col. 2 (reporting homeless advocate's
claim that New York City administration tears down only shanties that are "too visi-
ble"); Muir, Police Try to Confine Skid Row Homeless to Areas by Missions, LA. Tunes,
Feb. 10, 1989, § II, at 1, col. 4 (reporting that Los Angeles police try to keep homeless
people on sidewalks near missions, instead of letting them roam freely in downtown
district).
19. See Sandalow, Homeless Ousted at Civic Center, San Fran. Chron., July 7, 1990,
at Al, col. 1 (reporting on a police sweep of a homeless encampment in a public plaza
that had existed for three years).
20. See, eg., Feldman, For Some Home is Where the Tent Is, L.A. Times, Feb. 3,
1990, at B3, col. 1 (reporting that the Los Angeles police condone a circus tent housing
nearly 100 homeless); Atlantans Build Huts for Homeless, Chi. Tribune, July 23, 1989, at
1J, col. 1 [hereinafter Atlantans Build Huts] (Mayor of Atlanta pledged grant to group of
architects who illegally build huts for homeless on government and private property);
Bishop, Tent Cities Becoming the Front Lines, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1989, at A14, col. 3
(reporting that officials in Phoenix sanctioned a homeless encampment in a railroad
switching yard); Muir, No Place Like Home, L.A. Times, Sept. 25, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. I
(again describing the Los Angeles police as supporting an experimental homeless camp
for three months).
21. See e.g., Sneiderman, Lost Souls Lose, Jan. 17, 1991, L.A. Times, at Bl, col. 2
(reporting that "City of Lost Souls" encampment of homeless people existed on govern-
ment property for five years before discovery by government officials); A Hermit in Boston
Loses Bed and Bower, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1987, at A20, col. I (reporting that police
removed makeshift home of hermit who had lived on public land for 18 years).
22. See Pillsbury, The Homeless Are Not Stateless Their Poverty Challenges Our Fi-
delity to Equality of Law, L.A. Times, July 3, 1988, § V, at 5, col. 1.
23. See e.g., United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1473 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding
that man living in natural cave on government land was not protected under the fourth
amendment); Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976) (holding that squatters on government land were not entitled to
fourth amendment protection in their makeshift huts); State v. Dias, 62 Haw. 52, 55, 609
P.2d 637, 639-40 (1980) (finding that squatters on public land were protected under the
fourth amendment in their makeshift shacks); see also infra notes 153-219 (discussing
these and other cases regarding fourth amendment rights in makeshift homes). For other
recent cases involving the rights of the homeless, see Hanley, Suing, a Homeless Man
Refuses to Yield, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1991, at BI, col. 1 (reporting on homeless man
suing city officials for harassment); Curriden, Homeless Privacy Righw Court Requires
Warrant for Search of Duffel Bag Hidden Under Bridge, 77 A.B.A. J. 33 (July 1991)
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the search of a homeless man's makeshift home located under a highway,
State v. Mooney,24 generated much discussion on the fourth amendment
rights of the homeless.25 In light of these current circumstances, it is an
appropriate time to evaluate the relationship of the fourth amendment to
the homeless and, specifically, to determine whether such people are pro-
tected by the fourth amendment in their "homes."
This Note explores the rights of homeless persons to be free from war-
rantless searches and seizures under the fourth amendment. After argu-
ing that homeless persons do have this right under certain circumstances,
this Note proposes a test to determine when this protection is appropri-
ate. Part I provides a brief background on the history of fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence and the genesis of the meaning of "search." This
Part will show how the fourth amendment doctrine has evolved histori-
cally from protecting solely rights based on property interests, to protect-
ing reasonable expectations of privacy as set out by the Supreme Court in
the landmark case of Katz v. United States.26 This Part also discusses the
ambiguity inherent in the Katz test, as well as the subsequent refinement
of that test in later cases. Part II explores the cases that have focused on
the fourth amendment rights of both homeless and non-homeless people
in makeshift or temporary homes. This Part then critiques the reasoning
behind these cases in light of Katz and the Supreme Court's subsequent
fourth amendment jurisprudence. Part III then proposes a test, based on
Katz and its progeny, for determining whether the fourth amendment
protects a homeless person. This Part suggests that there cannot be a
categorical rule regarding the fourth amendment rights of the homeless;
instead, this Part argues that the test should be an ad hoc standard, and
sets out factors that courts should use to determine whether the homeless
are protected by the fourth amendment. Finally, this Note concludes
that the fourth amendment rights of the homeless will often be influenced
by the treatment of the homeless by the community in which they are
located.
I. GENESIS OF FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS: THE MEANING OF
"SEARCH" UNDER KATZ
A. Early Fourth Amendment Analysis
The fourth amendment provides: "The right of the people to be secure
(reporting on federal ruling in Miami "that police sweeps of homeless belongings were in
contempt of an earlier injunction").
24. 218 Conn. 85, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991). For a discussion
of this case, see infra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
25. SeeA Home Under the Highway, Wash. Post, Mar. 21, 1991, at A20, col. 1; Ken-
nedy, Legal Issue. Is Homeless Man's 'Home' a Castle?, Boston Globe, Jan. 13, 1991, at
29, col. 2; A Homeless Person's Cave is His or Her Castle, N.Y. Times, Dec. 4, 1990, at
A30, col. 4 (letter from Deborah A. Geier, Assistant Professor of Law, Cleveland State
University, to the Editor of the N.Y. Times); Calve, Does the Fourth Amendment Protect
the Homeless?, N.J.L.J., Oct. 18, 1990, at 9, col. 1.
26. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated."'27 With this language, the
fourth amendment requires law enforcement activities to be reasonable
only if they are "searches" or "seizures."28 The Supreme Court, how-
ever, has never fully resolved the question of what constitutes a search.29
In early fourth amendment analysis, the Court based its inquiry en-
tirely on property interests,30 and recognized police activity as a search
only if the government physically trespassed on a "constitutionally pro-
tected" area,31 such as a home. 2 Accordingly, in 1924, the Supreme
Court in Hester v. United States33 held that no search occurred when
government agents trespassed on land near the defendant's house, be-
cause such "open fields" were not constitutionally protected areas.3
Likewise, in Olmstead v. United States,35 the Court held that a govern-
ment wiretap of the defendant's telephone was not a search within the
fourth amendment because the activity did not constitute a trespass.36
Ultimately, however, the centrality of property and possessory inter-
ests in fourth amendment analysis began to erode, beginning with the
Court's statement in Silverman v. United States37 that "Fourth Amend-
ment rights are not inevitably measurable in terms of ancient niceties of
. . . real property law."3 In Warden v. Hayden ", the Court further
discredited the importance of property rights in fourth amendment anal-
ysis, and acknowledged that "the principal object of the Fourth Amend-
27. U.S. Const. amend. IV. In addition, the fourth amendment provides that: "no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
Iad
28. See I W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment
§ 2.1, at 299 (2d ed. 1987).
29. See id § 2.1(a), at 302.
30. For a discussion of the history of the fourth amendment, see generally N. Lasson,
The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion (1937).
31. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961); W. LaFave, supra note
28, § 2.1(a), at 302-03. "Constitutionally protected" areas were considered to be those
specified by the fourth amendment: "persons" (including bodies and clothing); "houses"
(including apartments and business offices); "papers;" and "effects" (such as
automobiles). See iL at 303.
32. The Supreme Court has traditionally regarded the home as a constitutionally pro-
tected area, and "accorded [it] the full range of Fourth Amendment protections." Lewis
v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966); see Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511; see also Payton
v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (noting the "overriding respect for the sanctity of
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic").
This regard for the sanctity of the home dates back to the early landmark case of Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886).
33. 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
34. See id. at 59.
35. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
36. See id at 466.
37. 365 U.S. 505 (1961).
38. Id. at 511.
39. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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ment is the protection of privacy rather than property... ."40 Finally,
with the landmark case of Katz v. United States,41 the Court completely
eradicated its reliance on property or possessory interests in its fourth
amendment analysis,42 and extended fourth amendment protections to
unreasonable invasions of privacy.43
B. Reformulation of Fourth Amendment Analysis Under Katz: The
"'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" Test
Katz is widely recognized as a watershed in fourth amendment juris-
prudence.' In Katz, government agents had wiretapped the defendant's
conversation at a public telephone booth and used this recording as evi-
dence at trial. Katz objected, claiming that the booth was a "constitu-
tionally protected area."4"
The Court held that the government's wiretapping did constitute a
"search and seizure" within the meaning of the fourth amendment.46
The Court, however, declined to frame the issue on whether the phone
booth was a "constitutionally protected area," and rejected the govern-
ment's contention that there was no fourth amendment violation because
the surveillance method used did not physically penetrate the telephone
booth.4 7 Rather, recognizing that "the Fourth Amendment protects peo-
ple, not places," the Court in Katz held that "[w]hat a person knowingly
exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as pri-
vate, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected. 48
With this formulation, the Katz court rejected the trespass-based test
and placed the focus of fourth amendment analysis on the interest
claimed by the individual, rather than on the means used by the govern-
ment.49 Thus, under Katz, any government activity that intrudes on an
interest protected by the fourth amendment is considered a search, re-
40. Id. at 304. The Court further stated, "[s]earches and seizures may be 'unreasona-
ble' within the Fourth Amendment even though the Government asserts a superior prop-
erty interest at common law," thus recognizing that "[the Court has] increasingly
discarded fictional and procedural barriers [that] rested on property concepts." Id.
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. Nevertheless, some commentators have noted that since Katz the Court has re-
turned to a property-based analysis. See infra notes 140-47 and accompanying text.
43. See W. LaFave, supra note 28, § 2.1(b), at 306-07; Amsterdam, Perspectives on
the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 382-83 (1974); Wasserstrom, The Incredi-
ble Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 257, 267 (1984).
44. See Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 382; W. LaFave, supra note 28, § 2. 1(a), at 303.
45. Katz, 389 U.S. at 349.
46. See id. at 353.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 351-52 (emphasis added). According to the Katz Court, whether the gov-
ernment has violated an individual's rights under the fourth amendment depends on
whether it has "violated the privacy upon which [the individual] justifiably relied." Id. at
353.
49. See Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 383.
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gardless of whether a trespass has occurred.50
In his Katz concurrence, Justice Harlan suggested a two-part test to
replace the outmoded property interest test. This test-"first that a per-
son have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable' " -is widely recognized as the touchstone of fourth
amendment analysis.5 2 Courts have interpreted the first prong of the test
to mean that the person claiming a fourth amendment violation must
have manifested an expectation that his conduct will be private." Thus,
this prong is treated as an objective, rather than a subjective, condition.'
As for the second prong of the Katz test, the Court has interpreted this to
mean that an expectation will be considered reasonable if it is based on
"understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.""5 The
Court, however, has found that "no single factor invariably will be deter-
minative" in this analysis. 6 Nevertheless, factors the Court has consid-
ered in assessing whether an individual's fourth amendment right has
been violated include: whether the individual "took normal precautions
to maintain his privacy-that is, precautions customarily taken by those
seeking privacy";57 the "intention of the Framers of the Fourth Amend-
50. See id.
51. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
52. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S.
735, 739 (1979); Note, Protecting Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment, 91 Yale LJ. 313,
316 (1981) [hereinafter Protecting Privacy].
53. See Smith, 442 U.S. at 740; United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 137 (2d Cir.
1980).
54. See Taborda, 635 F.2d at 137. This prong, however, has proved to be relatively
unimportant in determining the outcome of the cases. See Katz, In Search of a Fourth
Amendment for the Twenty-first Century, 65 Ind. UJ. 549, 560 & n.50 (1990); see also
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450-51 (1989) (expectation of privacy was not reasonable
even though defendant had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 215 (1986) (same); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182-
83 (1984) (expectation of privacy was not legitimate although petitioners had built fences
and put "No Trespassing" signs around their property).
Indeed, Justice Harlan later expressed misgivings about the subjective element of this
formulation in his oft-quoted dissent in United States v. White: "The analysis must, in
my view, transcend the search for subjective expectations or legal attributions of assump-
tions of risk. Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of
the laws that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present." 401
U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 384
("An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place.. . in a theory of
what the fourth amendment protects.").
55. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978); see also United States v. Taborda,
635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1980) (requiring that "the action occur in a place in which
society is prepared, because of its code of values and its notions of custom and civility, to
give deference to a manifested expectation of privacy").
56. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring); see Oliver v. United States, 466
U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
57. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 152 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Rawlings v.
Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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ment";58 the way an individual has used a location;59 and "our societal
understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protection
from government invasion." °
The Katz two-pronged test has come to be called the "reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy" test.61 Because of the difficulty in defining the
meaning of a "reasonable expectation of privacy," however, the Katz test
has been subject to criticism by many commentators. 62 Professor Am-
58. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984); see Rakas, 439 U.S. at 153
(Powell, J., concurring).
59. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring); see also
Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (expectation of privacy in "open fields" is not one society would
consider reasonable as area is not the "setting for... intimate activities").
60. Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178.
61. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Wasserstrom, supra note 43, at 268. The
Court has subsequently used the terms "legitimate" and "justifiable" interchangeably
with "reasonable." See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740; Note, Defining a Fourth
Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61
Wash. L. Rev. 191, 195 & n.27 (1986) [hereinafter Defining a Search].
Commentators have remarked that making an assessment based on whether an expec-
tation is "reasonable" makes the question a tautology-that is, courts will find that the
fourth amendment protects an individual only if he exhibits a reasonable expectation of
privacy, but society, represented by the courts, will only find an expectation of privacy to
be reasonable if it is protected by the fourth amendment. See Mickenberg, Fourth
Amendment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois" From Property to Privacy and Back, 16
New Eng. L. Rev. 197, 209-10 (1981). Thus, the question becomes a value judgment. See
Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 385, 403. As Professor Amsterdam has observed, the in-
quiry "is whether, if the particular form of surveillance practiced by the police is permit-
ted to go unregulated by constitutional restraints, the amount of privacy and freedom
remaining to citizens would be diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a
free and open society." Id. at 403.
62. See, eg., Mickenberg, supra note 61, at 383-85 (arguing that the characterization
of the Katz decision as the "reasonable expectation of privacy" test goes against the
meaning of Katz); Wasserstrom, supra note 43, at 270-71 & n.78 (without further expla-
nation, there is no justifiable way to decide what makes an expectation of privacy "rea-
sonable"); Wilkins, Defining the "'Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" An Emerging
Tripartite Analysis, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1077, 1088 & n.50, 1090 & n.56 (1987) (Katz test is
difficult for courts to apply and results in inconsistent application by the lower courts);
Protecting Privacy, supra note 52, at 327 ("reasonable expectation of privacy formula has
become a manipulable and restrictive analytical tool").
As a result, some have proposed alternate standards for fourth amendment analysis.
See, eg., Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Models of the Fourth
Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 Syracuse L. Rev.
647, 650-51 (1988) (arguing that a "'value-dominated model'" of the fourth amend-
ment-which focuses on the privacy interests invaded-rather than a "'means
model' "-which focuses on the manner in which the government intruded-should be
used); Katz, supra note 54, at 581 (proposing recognition of an intermediate category of
searches, described as "intrusions"); Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Modelfor Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 Minn. L. Rev. 583, 627 (1989) (proposing a test in
which courts look at degree of public exposure, not mere fact or possibility of public
exposure); Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded Vision of
the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 Hastings L.J. 645, 698 (1985) (arguing that
the inquiry should focus on "what informational privacy people need to enjoy guaranteed
rights and interests," rather than what privacy people expect); Defining a Search, supra
note 61, at 207-11 (arguing that "social norms of privacy" should serve as a standard for
defining fourth amendment searches).
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sterdam, on the other hand, has observed that the Katz decision, in re-
jecting prior formulas as being unable to act as a "talismanic solution to
every Fourth Amendment problem, 63 was precisely intended to "resist
captivation in any formula.""
C. Post-Katz: A Further View of the "Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy" Test
Katz is generally recognized as an expansion of fourth amendment
protections.65 Nevertheless, this expansive view of fourth amendment
protection, as articulated by the Warren Court in Katz, has been subse-
quently narrowed.66 Indeed, some commentators have argued that Katz
itself provided a means for narrowing the scope of fourth amendment
protection by allowing the Court to deny such protection based on a lack
of "reasonableness" or "legitimacy." '67 The Court, however, continues to
use Katz as the lodestar in its fourth amendment analysis.
In its application of the fourth amendment to post-Katz cases involv-
ing open fields, aerial surveillance, and garbage, the Court emphasized a
number of factors that currently play a significant role in its interpreta-
tion of the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. In particular,
the Court has reintroduced such factors as reference to a "place" and the
degree of physical intrusiveness of the government surveillance-factors
that many thought Katz had effectively eradicated-into its fourth
amendment analysis. Most importantly, the Court has introduced the
social practice of the community in question as a factor to be considered
when determining whether an expectation of privacy is one that society
would regard as reasonable.
1. The "Open Fields" Doctrine
Although Katz eradicated the notion of "constitutionally protected ar-
eas," the Court made clear in Oliver v. United States6" that reference to a
"place" still played a role in fourth amendment doctrine.69
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 n.9 (1967).
64. Amsterdam, supra note 43, at 385.
65. See iL
66. See Wasserstrom, supra note 43, at 269; Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth
Amendment, 26 U. Kan. L. Rev. 335, 362-63 (1978); Note, Defining a Search, supra note
61, at 191-92; Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 Mich.
L. Rev. 154, 154 & n.5 (1977) [hereinafter Reconsideration of Katz]; see also infra notes
68-152 and accompanying text (discussing post-Katz cases).
67. See Junker, The Structure of the Fourth Amendment: The Scope of the Protection,
79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1105, 1126 (1989); Katz, supra note 54, at 564; Wasser-
strom, supra note 43, at 271-72.
68. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
69. After Katz, many courts assumed that the "open fields" doctrine of Hester v.
United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), had been overruled sub silentio. See W. LaFave, supra
note 28, § 2.4(a), at 426. Nevertheless, although the Court in Oliver purported to follow
the standard set out in Katz, at least one commentator has argued that Oliver marked a
re-emergence of fourth amendment analysis based on property distinctions by holding
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Oliver involved two similar consolidated cases in which the police, af-
ter receiving tips that the petitioners were growing marijuana, investi-
gated their land despite the existence of "No Trespassing" signs.7 °
Although the petitioners had thus taken steps to manifest their expecta-
tion of privacy, the Court reaffirmed Hester v. United States71 and held
that "open fields" were not protected within the ambit of the fourth
amendment because an expectation of privacy in an open field is not one
that society is willing to regard as reasonable.72 The Court reasoned that
"open fields do not provide the setting for those intimate activities that
the [fourth] Amendment is intended to shelter from government interfer-
ence or surveillance. 73
2. The Aerial Surveillance Cases
Like Oliver, a group of decisions known as the "aerial surveillance
cases" resulted in a further narrowing of fourth amendment protection.74
In these three cases-California v. Ciraolo," Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,76 and Florida v. Riley 7-a divided Court wrestled with the issue
of when the fourth amendment prohibits aerial surveillance. The Court,
relying on factors such as physical intrusiveness, used the language of
Katz to move farther away from its original spirit.78 Significantly, these
cases demonstrate the use of social custom in the Court's fourth amend-
ment analysis.
In California v. Ciraolo,7 9 the Court held that the petitioner's fourth
amendment rights were not violated by a warrantless naked-eye aerial
observation made by police flying over the defendant's backyard.8 0 In
Ciraolo, the police arrived at the defendant's backyard on a tip that he
that "open fields" are constitutionally unprotected areas. See Note, Florida v. Riley: The
Emerging Standard for Aerial Surveillance of the Curtilage, 43 Vand. L. Rev. 275, 283-84
(1990) [hereinafter Emerging Standard].
70. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173-75.
71. 265 U.S. 57 (1924); see supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
72. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 178-79.
73. Id. The dissent in Oliver, written by Justice Marshall and joined by Justices Bren-
nan and Stevens, noted that in Katz the Court "repudiated the proposition that the
Fourth Amendment applies only to a limited set of locales or kinds or property," and
thus criticized the majority's holding as being "inconsistent with this line of cases." Id. at
187-88 (Marshall, J., dissenting). To some, the rationale of the dissenters in Oliver is
closer to the spirit of the Katz standard. See W. LaFave, supra note 28, § 2.4(a), at 428.
Subsequent use of the "open fields" doctrine has not been restricted to land suitable for
pasture. See generally id. § 2.4(a), at 425 (noting that "open fields" doctrine has been
applied to wooded areas, vacant lots in urban areas, open beaches, and open waters).
74. See Gutterman, supra note 62, at 712; Note, Florida v. Riley: The Descent of
Fourth Amendment Protections in Aerial Surveillance Cases, 17 Hastings Const. L.Q. 725,
726 (1990) [hereinafter Descent].
75. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
76. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
77. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
78. See Gutterman, supra note 62, at 712-17.
79. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
80. See id. at 215.
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grew marijuana there, but were unable to see into the yard because it was
enclosed by fences. Nevertheless, the officers were able to identify the
plants by later flying over the defendant's backyard at an altitude of 1000
feet.A On the basis of this observation, the police were able to obtain a
search warrant for Ciraolo's property that subsequently led to the seizure
of seventy-three marijuana plants.8 2
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless aerial
surveillance of the yard from an altitude of 1000 feet was valid under the
fourth amendment.8 3 As in Oliver, the Court found that the defendant
had manifested a subjective expectation of privacy, thus fulfilling the first
prong of the Katz test. But because this expectation was not one society
would regard as "reasonable," the Court held that the defendant failed
the second prong of the test. 4 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the ma-
jority, reintroduced the notion of trespass into the Court's view of the
fourth amendment by emphasizing that the police had made their obser-
vations from within the public navigable airspace 5 and that they did so
"in a physically nonintrusive manner." 6 In addition, Chief Justice Bur-
ger noted that Ciraolo had plainly risked public exposure since airflight is
routine and any member of the public could have looked down and seen
the backyard. 7
In the companion case to Ciraolo, Dow Chemical Co. v. United
States,"8 the Supreme Court held that the Environmental Protection
Agency's warrantless aerial surveillance of Dow's 2000-acre manufactur-
ing complex, using a precision aerial camera, was not a search under the
fourth amendment.8 9 Dow had installed "elaborate" security measures
to prevent the public from viewing the facility at the ground level.' In
81. See id at 209.
82. See id at 209-10.
83. See id. at 210. Originally, the trial court had denied a motion to suppress the
evidence and Ciraolo was convicted. See id The California Court of Appeal then re-
versed, holding that the warrantless search violated Ciraolo's fourth amendment rights.
See id
84. See id at 213-14.
85. See id at 213. Justice Powell, joined in dissent by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, criticized the majority's reliance on the fact that members of the public
may fly in planes over the backyard. See id at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting). Powell noted
that the risk that a member of the public flying overhead would actually be able to ob-
serve such activities was "virtually nonexistent" and "too trivial to protect against." Id.
at 223-24. In this same vein, the majority's approach has been criticized as ignoring the
.normative element of the 'reasonable expectation' standard." See The Supreme Court.
1985 Term - Leading Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 100, 142 (1986) [hereinafter 1985 Leading
Cases].
86. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
87. See id at 214-15.
88. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
89. See id at 239.
90. See id at 229. These security measures included an eight-foot high fence sur-
rounding the entire complex; monitoring by security guards and closed-circuit televisions;
motion detectors; and strict policies prohibiting the taking of photographs without man-
agement approval. See id at 241 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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addition, Dow had taken precautions to protect the complex from aerial
surveillance.9 The Environmental Protection Agency, after having been
denied permission to visit Dow, hired a private aerial photographer with
a sophisticated aerial camera to take photographs of the Dow complex
without first obtaining a search warrant.92
Despite these security measures, Chief Justice Burger, again writing
for the majority, held that the 2,000 acres of the industrial complex were
more analogous to unprotectable "open fields" than to the curtilage of a
home, which is entitled to fourth amendment protection.9 a Moreover,
the Court found that "the Government has 'greater latitude to conduct
warrantless inspections of commercial property,' because 'the expecta-
tion of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such
property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual's
home.' "9' Chief Justice Burger reasoned that "[tlhe intimate activities
associated with family privacy and the home and its curtilage simply do
not reach the outdoor areas or spaces between structures and buildings of
a manufacturing plant," and thus the area in question was more like an
unprotectable open field than curtilage." Lastly, the Court relied on the
fact that, because the photographs did not reveal "intimate activities,"
their use was not proscribed by the fourth amendment. 96
Finally, in Florida v. Riley,97 a sheriff went to Riley's mobile home to
investigate a tip that Riley was growing marijuana on his property.98
The sheriff, however, was unable to view the contents of a greenhouse
that was located ten to twenty feet behind the mobile home.99 A wire
fence posted with a "DO NOT ENTER" sign surrounded both the mo-
bile home and the greenhouse.1" The sheriff then obtained a helicopter
and circled over the defendant's property at an altitude of approximately
91. See id. at 241.
92. See id. at 242.
93. See id. at 239.
94. Id. at 237-38 (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1981)).
95. Id. at 236.
96. See id. The Court, however, noted in dicta that surveillance by equipment not
widely available to the public might violate the fourth amendment. See id. at 238-39.
Justice Powell, in a dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun, criti-
cized the majority for "ignor[ing] the heart of the Katz standard" by basing its holding on
the government's failure to trespass, instead of focusing on the petitioner's privacy inter-
ests. Id. at 247.
The decisions in both Ciraolo and Dow have been widely criticized. As one commenta-
tor has stated, "[c]onsidered together, the Ciraolo and Dow decisions demonstrate the
Court's eagerness to undercut the reasonable expectation [of privacy] standard set out in
Katz." 1985 Leading Cases, supra note 85, at 143; see also Descent, supra note 74, at 738
("Ciraolo and Dow opened the door to further restriction of fourth amendment protection
by tying the level of fourth amendment protection to the definition of lawful ... viewing
locations.").
97. 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (plurality opinion).
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400 feet.101
Justice White, writing for the plurality, held that police surveillance by
a helicopter at an altitude of 400 feet did not violate the fourth amend-
ment. 0 2 Although the plurality initially found that Riley had manifested
a subjective expectation of privacy-thus fulfilling the first prong of the
Katz test° 3-it also found that this expectation was not one that society
would regard as reasonable because the helicopter was within navigable
airspace and thus the greenhouse could have been observed by any mem-
ber of the public legally flying over it.' Citing Ciraolo, the plurality
reasoned that" 'private and commercial flight [by helicopter] in the pub-
lic airways is routine' in this country."'05  The Court took note of the
lack of evidence that helicopter flights at such altitudes are so rare that
Riley could have reasonably believed he would not have been ob-
served."°6 Furthermore, the Court stressed that "there is no indication
that such flights are unheard of in Pasco County, Florida," where Riley's
property was located,10 7 and noted in dictum that aerial surveillance will
not necessarily "always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment sim-
ply because the plane is within the navigable airspace specified by
law."10 This is significant because, in so finding, the Court made clear
that if Riley had brought forth evidence showing that flights at such alti-
tudes were rare in the country or in the county, his expectation of pri-
vacy might have been considered reasonable, despite the legality of the
flights. Finally, the plurality also reiterated the Ciraolo Court's reason-
ing-that "the home and its curtilage are not necessarily protected from
inspection that involves no physical invasion"° -and concluded that no
intimate details of the home were observed and that "there was no undue
noise, and no wind, dust, or threat of injury."" 0
Justice O'Connor, in her concurrence, agreed with the plurality that
Riley's expectation of privacy was not one that society would regard as
reasonable.' She disagreed, however, with the plurality's emphasis on
police compliance with Federal Aviation Authority regulations in deter-
mining whether the defendant's fourth amendment rights had been vio-
lated."' Justice O'Connor argued that the relevant inquiry should not be
whether" '[a]ny member of the public could legally have been flying over
Riley's property in a helicopter at the altitude of 400 feet,' "3 but
101. See id
102. See id at 451-52.
103. See id at 449.
104. See id at 450-51.
105. Id at 450 (quoting California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986)).
106. See id. at 451-52.
107. Id at 450.
108. Id at 451.
109. Id at 449.
110. Id at 452.
111. See id at 452 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
112. See id
113. Id at 455 (quoting plurality at 451).
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whether the public actually does travel overhead at that altitude with
such regularity that Riley's expectation of privacy was not one that soci-
ety would recognize as "'reasonable.' " 14 Justice O'Connor concluded
that, if the public rarely travels overhead at such altitudes, Riley could
not have "'knowingly expose[d]' his greenhouse to the public view.' "I
The standard enunciated by Justice O'Connor, and agreed to by the four
dissenting Justices, 116 has been recognized as superior to the analysis put
forth by the plurality in Riley because it is closer to the Katz rationale. 117
One commentator has termed this standard the "frequency standard"
because the "linchpin of this analysis is the frequency of nongovernmen-
tal flights at the altitude in question."' 1I8
Although the plurality relied on the legality of the police officer's van-
tage point, it is important to recognize that all the Justices in Riley dis-
cuss the frequency of flights at a certain altitude as an important
factor.1 9 Thus, actual societal practice-such as the regularity with
which the public flies overhead-is a significant factor in the Court's
analysis. In fact, at least one commentator contends that if, in a similar
situation, a defendant could prove the rarity of flights at the altitude in
question, the Court would probably find that the fourth amendment had
been violated. 20 Ultimately, however, the Court in Riley created confu-
sion by relying on the government's presence in legally navigable air-
114. Id. at 454 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). Similarly, Justice Brennan, joined in dissent by Justices Marshall and Ste-
vens, reiterated that the plurality's reliance on the fact that the helicopter was within an
altitude allowed by the FAA was misplaced, and stressed that this emphasis "ignores the
very essence of Katz." Id. at 457 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued that
the correct inquiry was not whether the police observed the property from a vantage
point where they had a legal right to be, but whether such observation was "so common-
place" that Riley's expectation could not be deemed reasonable. See id. at 460.
Justice Blackmun, in a separate dissent, agreed that the fact that the helicopter was
flying within legal altitudes should not determine whether an expectation of privacy is
"reasonable," and noted the importance that a majority of the Court (Justice O'Connor
and the four dissenting Justices) agreed on this analysis. See id. at 467 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
115. Id. at 455.
116. See supra note 114.
117. See Emerging Standard, supra note 69, at 291.
118. Id. at 292.
119. The plurality noted the significance of the lack of evidence proving flights at such
altitudes are "sufficiently rare." Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989). Justice
O'Connor posed the question in terms of whether there was a "sufficient regularity" of
flights at that altitude. Id. at 454 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Brennan (joined by
two Justices) formulated the issue as whether observation of the area by the general pub-
lic was "so commonplace" that the expectation could not be considered reasonable. Id.
at 460 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, Justice Blackmun noted the rarity of helicopter
flights at an altitude of 400 feet. See id. at 467 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. See Fee, Narrowing the Protection of the Fourth Amendment, 1989 Ann. Surv.
Am. L. 371, 396. Indeed, the Colorado Court of Appeals in People v. Pollock, 796 P.2d
63 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), found that a warrantless aerial surveillance of the defendant's
backyard violated the fourth amendment after he introduced evidence on the infrequency
of flights at the altitude in question. See id. at 64-65.
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space, and then retreating from this position by noting that the aerial
surveillance within legal limits "will [not] always pass muster under the
Fourth Amendment."' 21 The courts have not yet resolved this issue."
3. The Fourth Amendment and Garbage
In California v. Greenwood,'23 the Court found that an expectation of
privacy in garbage bags left for collection outside the curtilage of the
home was unreasonable. 24 With this holding, the Court also empha-
sized the important role that social custom plays in determining whether
an expectation of privacy is one society would consider as reasonable.
The police in Greenwood, following a tip that Greenwood might be
involved in drug trafficking, conducted a surveillance of Greenwood's
house.' 25 After three months of observation, the police asked Green-
wood's regular garbage collector to turn over the garbage to police of-
ficers, who then inspected it without a warrant. 126 Upon inspection of
the garbage, the police discovered narcotics, and they subsequently ar-
rested Greenwood and another occupant of the house.'2  After the de-
fendants were out on bail, the police again obtained Greenwood's
garbage from the trash collector without a warrant. Finding more evi-
dence of narcotics, the police arrested Greenwood a second time.1 28
The Supreme Court held that the police did not violate the defendant's
fourth amendment rights.'2 9 Justice White, writing for the majority, rea-
soned that the defendants had "exposed their garbage to the public,"
thus making their expectation of privacy unreasonable. 30 First, the
Court found that, because the defendants had "placed their refuse at the
curb for the express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash
collector, who might himself have sorted through [it]," they had no rea-
121. Riley, 488 U.S. at 451.
122. The lower courts' post-Riley decisions illustrate this confusion. Compare United
States v. Penny-Feeney, 773 F. Supp. 220, 227 (D. Haw. 1991) (citing Riley for proposi-
tion that no violation of fourth amendment occurs when police view illegal activity from
where they have a legal right to be); United States v. Boger, 755 F. Supp. 333, 339 (E.D.
Wash. 1990) (same) and State v. Lange, 158 Wis. 2d 609, 622, 463 N.W.2d 390, 395 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1990) (same) with United States v. Hendrickson, 940 F.2d 320, 323 (8th Cir.)
(citing Riley for proposition that there was no fourth amendment search because air
travel is routine), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 610 (1991); People v. Pollock, 796 P.2d 63, 64
(Colo. CL App. 1990) (finding aerial surveillance violated fourth amendment because of
proof of infrequency of such flights) and State v. Venet, 103 Or. App. 363, 366, 797 P.2d
1055, 1056 (1990) (whether police were flying above or below legal navigable airspace is
irrelevant to fourth amendment analysis), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 191 (1991). See also
People v. McKim, 214 Cal. App. 3d 766, 771, 263 Cal. Rptr. 21, 24 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989)
(finding the "dust has not entirely settled on the issue of helicopter aerial surveillance").
123. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
124. See id at 40-41.
125. See id at 37.
126. See id
127. See id. at 38.
128. See id.
129. See id at 39-44.
130. Id at 40.
19921 1017
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
sonable expectation of privacy in the items left out for collection.' 3, Sec-
ond, the Court emphasized that "[i]t is common knowledge that plastic
garbage bags left on ... a public street are readily accessible to animals,
children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public,"'132 and
thus held that the defendants' expectation of privacy was not reasonable
because the "evidence of criminal activity... could have been observed
by any member of the public."1 33 Finally, the majority rejected Green-
wood's argument that his expectation of privacy should be deemed rea-
sonable because California state law recognized a right to privacy in
one's garbage.134 Justice White emphasized that whether an expectation
of privacy is reasonable is not dependent on state law, but on "our socie-
tal understanding that certain areas deserve the most scrupulous protec-
tion from government invasion."1 35
D. Summary of Post-Katz Cases
Although the Supreme Court has often adopted a restrictive approach
in its post-Katz jurisprudence,1 36 the Court's analysis underlying these
cases demonstrates that the scope of fourth amendment protection re-
mains broader than it was in the pre-Katz era. In particular, a number of
factors evident in these cases play an important role in the Court's fourth
amendment jurisprudence. These factors include: (1) reference to the
"place" in which the activity occurred;3 7 (2) the degree of intrusiveness
131. Id.
132. Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted). In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice
Marshall, acknowledged the occurrence of isolated intrusions into garbage bags, but ob-
served that
[t]he mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open and rummage
through the containers does not negate the expectation of privacy in their con-
tents any more than the possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of pri-
vacy in the home; or the possibility that an operator will listen in on a telephone
conversation negates an expectation of privacy in the words spoken on the
telephone.
Id. at 54 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133. Id at 41.
134. See id. at 43.
135. Id. at 43 (emphasis added by Court in Greenwood) (quoting Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984)).
The Greenwood decision has been criticized by commentators on numerous grounds.
See, e.g., Fee, supra note 120, at 381 (noting four errors in the Greenwood Court's reason-
ing); The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 102 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 195 (1988) ("[t]he
questionable use of precedent to support this result promises to exacerbate the confusion
in the Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence"); Serr, supra note 62, at 623 (Greenwood
decision "unnecessarily drew an absolute line between full fourth amendment protection
and no fourth amendment protection."); Note, California v. Greenwood- A Proposed
Compromise to the Exploitation of the Objective Expectation of Privacy, 38 Buffalo L. Rev.
647, 667 (1990) (proposing a test for garbage that would "reflect the level of privacy
which is expected in a particular area by members of our society").
136. See Wasserstrom, supra note 43, at 269; Yackle, supra note 66, at 362-63; Defining
a Search, supra note 61, at 191; Serr, supra note 62, at 587; Reconsideration of Katz, supra
note 66, at 154 & n.5.
137. See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179 (referring to "open fields"); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
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of the surveillance;' 38 and (3) the custom of the community."'
The Court, in these recent cases, continually refers to the "place" in
which the surveillance occurred."4 Although this reference to a place
may signify a return to the pre-Katz era of a trespass-based analysis,' 4 1 it
is possible to reconcile this trend with the Katz rationale. In keeping
with the spirit of Katz, the Court has found that certain places deserve
fourth amendment protection because of the privacy-not property-in-
terests associated with those places.' 42 Thus, the Court refers to "place"
simply as one factor in making the larger determination of whether the
expectation of privacy is reasonable. 143 Accordingly, the Court has es-
tablished a hierarchy in which certain places, because of their association
with intimate activities, will more likely be accorded a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy."4
States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986) (distinguishing between "industrial curtilage" and "cur-
tilage of a dwelling").
138. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989) ("the home and its curtilage arc not
necessarily protected from inspection that involves no physical invasion"); California v.
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting that police activity took place in a "physically
nonintrusive manner").
139. See infra notes 148-51 and accompanying text.
140. See, eg., Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (referring to "open
fields"); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237 (1986) (referring to "com-
mercial property").
141. See, eg., Gutterman, supra note 62, at 712 (court returned to the notion of tres-
pass in Dow and Ciraolo); Note, Reviving the Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under the
Open View Doctrine: Dow Chemical v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 191, 228 (1988)
("while couched in Katz terminology, the Dow majority's analysis effectively overruled
the Katz standard and reverted to a physical trespass inquiry").
142. See United States v. Segura, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (Court noted that "the
home is sacred in Fourth Amendment terms not primarily because of the occupants'
possessory interests in the premises, but because of their privacy interests in the activities
that take place within") (emphasis in original). In so doing, the analysis remained within
the boundaries of Katz. See Wilkins, supra note 62, at 1111-12; see also Katz, 389 U.S. at
361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (observing that fourth amendment determination "requires
reference to a 'place' "). Thus, as one commentator has noted, "[a]fter Katz, the home is
a protected locale, not only by virtue of its explicit mention in the language of the fourth
amendment, but also (and perhaps primarily) because of the human activities innately
associated with it." Wilkins, supra note 62, at 1111-12.
143. See Wilkins, supra note 62, at 1109-14. Even where the Court refers to property
rights in its analysis, this continues to be but one factor in the determination. One com-
mentator has argued that the Court has continued to increase its reliance on property
interests after Katz, culminating in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See Mick-
enberg, supra note 61, at 198. In Rakas, the Court held that the petitioners, who "as-
serted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile [searched], nor an
interest in the property seized," did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy. Rakas,
439 U.S. at 148. Even so, the Court specifically stated that property rights, though an
important factor, would not be dispositive of the analysis. See id. at 143 n.12. Thus,
property rights are still considered under the Katz analysis, although they are not deter-
minative. See Mickenberg, supra note 61, at 209. Despite this, many lower courts have
used Rakas to support their findings that a trespasser can not have rights under the
fourth amendment because they do not have property rights in the place in question. See
United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1068
(1984); United States v. Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 64 (2d Cir. 1980).
144. See Wilkins, supra note 62, at 1113; see also United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294,
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In addition, the Court appears to have reintroduced the factor of phys-
ical intrusiveness into its analysis.145 Some observers have argued that
this, like the Court's reference to "place," 146 signifies a return to a prop-
erty-based analysis. Like the Court's use of "place," however, the recent
trend of referring to the degree of physical intrusiveness may be viewed
as a factor that was not eliminated by Katz, but merely relegated to a less
important role in making the fourth amendment determination. 47
Finally, more recent decisions as Florida v. Riley ' 48 and California v.
Greenwood'49 suggest that the Court places great emphasis on societal
customs-rather than mere legality-in determining whether an expecta-
tion of privacy is one society would regard as reasonable. A majority of
the Court in Riley found that the actual frequency of the flights by the
public, not just the legality of the government viewpoint, was a signifi-
cant factor in its analysis. 5 Likewise, in Greenwood, the Court pur-
ported to base its holding on actual societal customs-the "common
knowledge" that people often rummage through the trash-rather than
on the state law that recognizes a right to privacy in one's garbage.'I'
In sum, the factors emphasized in these cases are useful in determining
the current state of Katz's "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard
that has proved to be troublesome to courts and commentators alike.' 5 2
Nevertheless, in the specific context of the rights of the homeless, the
lower courts, as further discussed below, are often deficient in their appli-
cation of the "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard to makeshift
or temporary homes, going farther than required under the Supreme
Court's post-Katz jurisprudence, and placing undue emphasis on the tres-
pass factor in their analyses.
II. THE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN A MAKESHIFT HOME
A. Temporary Homes
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[a]t the very core [of the
fourth amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his own
302 (1986) (finding that a barn which is not inhabited has a lesser expectation of privacy);
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 237-38 (1986) (finding an expectation of
privacy in commercial property differs from that in a home); California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (finding that a mobile home has a lesser expectation of privacy than
a traditional home).
145. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting the police ob-
tained evidence "in a physically nonintrusive manner"); Dow, 476 U.S. at 237 (noting
issue in case was "aerial observation ... without physical entry"); Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 452 (1989) (finding that "there was no undue noise, and no wind, dust, or threat
of injury.").
146. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
147. See Wilkins, supra note 62, at 1114-21.
148. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
149. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
150. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
151. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion."'' 5 3
This high regard for the sanctity of the home does not derive from com-
mon-law property rights in the premises; instead, it is based on the pri-
vacy interests that are normally associated with the activities that take
place in the home. 54
For this reason, fourth amendment protection does not merely extend
to occupants of permanent residences; indeed, the Supreme Court has
extended this protection to temporary homes as well. For instance, the
Court has long recognized that a guest in a hotel has a constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures "[n]o less than
the tenant of a house,"' 5 as does a tenant of a rooming house. 56 Like-
wise, the Court recently held in Minnesota v. Olson I" that overnight
guests have a reasonable expectation of privacy in another's home, "de-
spite the fact that they have no legal interest in the premises and do not
have the legal authority to determine who may or may not enter the
household."'58 Consistent with its other recent decisions that have
looked to social practice,"5 9 the Court in Olson emphasized that
"[s]taying overnight is a longstanding social custom" and noted that so-
ciety regarded this function as "valuable."'"
Similarly, lower courts have recognized that the protection of the
fourth amendment applies to such temporary homes as college dormito-
ries and fraternity houses, 6' and even to a "home" whose structure itself
is not permanent. For example, some courts have recognized a reason-
able expectation of privacy in such transient homes as tents.162 Thus, in
Kelley v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals found that the defendant
was entitled to fourth amendment protection in the tent in which he lived
because
153. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
154. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 810 (1984).
155. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964).
156. See McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 454 (1948).
157. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
158. Id at 99.
159. See supra notes 74-152 and accompanying text.
160. 495 U.S. at 98.
161. See, eg., Reardon v. Wroan, 811 F.2d 1025 (7th Cir. 1987) (fraternity house);
Morale v. Grigel, 422 F. Supp. 988 (D.C.N.H. 1976) (dormitory room).
162. See Kelley v. State, 146 Ga. App. 179, 182-83, 245 S.E.2d 872, 874-75 (1978);
State v. Clark, 1982 WL 6502, at *2 (Ohio App. July 9, 1982); see also Olson v. State, 166
Ga. App. 104, 106, 303 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1983) (noting in dicta that "an inhabited tent
constitutes a 'dwelling'" for fourth amendment purposes), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1209
(1984). This regard for the sanctity of the home regardless of the permanence of its
structure echoes the belief rooted in English common law. Most often quoted in this
regard is William Pitt, Earl of Chatham, in his remarks to Parliament in 1763:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown.
It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm
may enter; the rain may enter, but the King of England cannot enter-all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement!
Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958) (quoting William Pitt).
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the tent-dweller is no less protected from unreasonable government in-
trusions merely because his dwelling... place, whether flimsy or firm,
permanent or transient, is its inhabitant's unquestionable zone of pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment, for in his dwelling a citizen un-
questionably is entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.
1 63
Thus, by focusing their inquiry on the privacy interest at stake rather
than on the property interest, courts have expanded upon the traditional
view that an individual is entitled to fourth amendment protection in his
home. Courts now recognize that a reasonable expectation of privacy
may exist in a variety of settings-including, but not limited to, a tradi-
tional home.
B. Squatters
Although some lower courts recognize that transient "homes" are pro-
tected under the fourth amendment, other courts have not expanded this
view to include the individuals living on public property. These courts
have, in general, based their holdings on the individual's lack of property
rights in the area in question.
For example, in Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon,'64 the First Circuit
held that squatters on public land in Puerto Rico had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy because they were trespassers and had no legal right
to occupy the land or to build edifices upon it.' 6 - In addition, the Amez-
quita court noted that, because the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico had
twice requested that the plaintiffs leave the area, the squatters had no
colorable claim to occupy the land, and hence any expectation of privacy
could not have been reasonable.
1 66
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit denied extending
fourth amendment protection to a temporary "home" in United States v.
Ruckman. 1 7 In Ruckman, the defendant's "home" was a cave located
on land owned by the United States and overseen by the Bureau of Land
163. Kelley, 146 Ga. App. at 182-83, 245 S.E.2d at 874-75.
164. 518 F.2d 8 (ist Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976).
165. See id. at 12. The plaintiffs were members of a squatters' community located on
property owned by the Land Authority of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. See id. at
9. When the Land Authority threatened to destroy their "homes," they brought a class
action suit to enjoin the government from doing so, and additionally sought damages.
See id. at 9-10.
The district court held for the squatters, finding that the plaintiffs' privacy was invaded
by "the practice on the part of some of the defendants of looking into and poking through
the homes of some of the plaintiffs without a search warrant or judicial authorization of
any kind before ordering the bulldozers to destroy some of the unoccupied structures."
Amezquita v. Colon, 378 F.Supp. 737, 744 (D.P.R. 1974), rev'd, Amezquita v. Her-
nandez-Colon, 518 F.2d 8 (lst Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976). On Appeal,
however, the First Circuit reversed, holding that because the squatters were not legally
entitled to occupy the land and build edifices on it, they could have no reasonable expec-
tation of privacy. See Amezquita, 518 F.2d at 12.
166. See id. at 11.
167. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
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Management ("BLM"). 168 The cave served as Ruckman's home for
eight months; he had built a makeshift "door" on the entrance and fur-
nished it with a bed and other furniture.1 69  The local authorities, fur-
thermore, were aware that Ruckman was living in the cave area. 7"°
After Ruckman was arrested for failure to answer a misdemeanor
charge, BLM and local authorities returned to the cave without a war-
rant to "clean it out" and found firearms that formed the basis for the
case.
17 1
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that although the defendant might have
satisfied the first prong of the Katz test-a manifested expectation of pri-
vacy-the second prong of the test was not fulfilled because he was a
trespasser on public land. 172 The court reasoned that the "open fields"
cases were relevant because open fields are more accessible to the public
and police than other structures, such as a home or office. 73 In a
strongly worded dissent, Judge McKay criticized the majority in Ruck-
man for "reverting to discredited notions and obsolete fourth amend-
ment analysis."17 4 According to Judge McKay, by finding Ruckman's
status as a trespasser to be dispositive of his fourth amendment rights,
the majority wrongly relied on legal property interests that the Supreme
Court had rejected as a basis for fourth amendment analysis since
Katz. 175 Instead, the dissent argued, Ruckman had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy because he "lived [in the cave] continuously for eight
months [and h]e 'took normal precautions to maintain his privacy.' 1,76
Furthermore, the dissent noted that finding an expectation of privacy to
be reasonable did not preclude the government from removing the de-
fendant from the cave, as he was not entitled to live there; it only pre-
cluded the government from searching his dwelling without a search
warrant.177
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Hawaii found that property rights
were not controlling in assessing whether squatters on public land were
protected by the fourth amendment. In State v. Dias,178 police without a
warrant had seized evidence of illegal gambling from a shack on "Squat-
ters' Row," located on property owned by the State of Hawaii.' 79 The
Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the evidence seized from within the
shacks should be suppressed, but that the observations made by the po-




172. See id at 1472-73.
173. See id at 1473.
174. Id at 1478 (McKay, J., dissenting).
175. See idL at 1477.
176. Id at 1478 (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980)).
177. See id
178. 62 Haw. 52, 609 P.2d 637 (1980).
179. See iL at 53-54, 609 P.2d at 639. The trial court granted the defendants' motion
to suppress the evidence seized there. See id.
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lice from outside the shack were not protected by the fourth amend-
ment.1 80  The court in Dias distinguished Amezquita v. Hernandez-
Colon,18  noting that in Dias the government had allowed the squatters to
remain on the government land for a considerable period of time, and
that "although no tenancy under property concepts was thereby created,
we think that this long acquiescence by the government has given rise to
a reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of the defendants, at least
with respect to the interior of the building itself."' 82 Nevertheless, be-
cause the defendants' shacks were located on public property to which
they did not have exclusive rights, the court found that aural and visual
observations made from outside the shacks were admissible, as the de-
fendants could not reasonably expect that members of the public would
not approach the shacks. 8 3
Other state courts have rejected the fourth amendment claims of
squatters in abandoned houses based upon the squatters' lack of rights
against other people wanting to enter the house.' 84 Even these courts,
however, have implied that a de facto-rather than a legal-right to ex-
clude others may be sufficient to establish an expectation of privacy as
reasonable. 185
C. Within the Makeshift Home
Finally, one court has dealt with the issue of a homeless man living on
public property by defining the scope of fourth amendment protection
within the makeshift home itself. In State v. Mooney,18 6 the Connecticut
Supreme Court recognized that a homeless person had a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in a duffel bag and cardboard box that were located
within his makeshift home, in an area underneath a highway overpass. 18 7
The Mooney court declined, however, to decide whether the defendant's
broad claim of an expectation of privacy in the area underneath the
bridge was reasonable. Instead, it decided the case on the narrower issue
of whether Mooney had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the con-
180. See id. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640.
181. 518 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 916 (1976); see supra notes 164-
66 and accompanying text.
182. State v. Dias, 62 Haw. 52, 55, 609 P.2d 637, 640 (1980).
183. See id. at 56, 609 P.2d at 640.
184. See Commonwealth v. Cameron, 385 Pa. Super. Ct. 492, 498, 561 A.2d 783, 786
(1989); Morris v. State, 521 So. 2d 1364, 1366 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987). But see Cotton v.
United States, 371 F.2d 385, 391 (9th Cir. 1967) (noting in dictum that the Supreme
Court would probably not deny fourth amendment rights to a squatter who has taken
"actual possession" of the premises).
185. See, e.g., Cameron, 385 Pa. Super. Ct. at 498, 561 A.2d at 786 ("there must be
some legal or de facto right to control the area in question"); Morris, 521 So. 2d at 1366
(finding no reasonable expectation of privacy because squatter had no right to and did not
try to exclude others from abandoned house).
186. 218 Conn. 85, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
187. See id. at 98, 588 A.2d at 154. In reaching this conclusion, the court reversed the
trial court's denial of Mooney's motion to suppress the evidence. See id. at 87, 588 A.2d
at 149.
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tents of his duffel bag and box. 8'
The defendant in Mooney was a murder and robbery suspect who had
lived for approximately one month underneath a highway bridge abut-
ment on land owned by the Connecticut state department of transporta-
tion. 189 Mooney was the only person to occupy that space during the
time he lived there. 'I When he left the area, Mooney hid his belongings
so that they could not be seen from the bottom of the embankment. 191
The police went to Mooney's "home" without a search warrant, where
they found his belongings, including the duffel bag and cardboard box
that they later searched.' 92 The state argued that Mooney was not pro-
tected by the fourth amendment because: (1) the area searched was in
effect an open field; (2) the defendant was a trespasser on public land; and
(3) the defendant's expectation of privacy could not have been reasonable
because it was an area accessible to the public. 193 The court rejected all
of these arguments, noting that although "property left by persons in
open fields or public places may not command fourth amendment protec-
tion," open fields cases such as Oliver were distinguishable from the in-
stant case because it involved closed containers."9' Moreover, the
Connecticut Supreme Court, citing the dissent in Ruckman, noted that
the defendant's status as a trespasser may be considered as a factor in
determining whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, but it is not dispositive of the issue.'
The Mooney court also found that California v. Greenwood 96 did not
control the case. 197 The court noted that "leaving one's property in an
area 'readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and
other members of the public' may render one's expectation of privacy less
than reasonable."' 98 But the court distinguished the instant case because
Mooney had not expressly left his belongings for collection or disposal by
188. See id. at 94, 588 A.2d at 152.
189. See id. at 90-91, 588 A.2d at 150-51.
190. See id. at 92, 588 A.2d at 151.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 90, 588 A.2d at 150.
193. See id at 93, 588 A.2d at 152.
194. Id. at 99-100, 588 A.2d at 155.
195. See id at 97, 588 A.2d at 153-54. In addition, the court looked to the line of
abandonment cases and distinguished them from the instant situation where a homeless
defendant lived in a secluded area that the police were aware he regarded as his home.
See id at 107-09, 588 A.2d at 158-59. The test for abandonment, according to the court
in Mooney, is whether "the owner or possessor may fairly be deemed as a matter of law to
have relinquished his expectation of privacy in the object in question." Id. at 108, 588
A.2d at 159. The court reasoned that the defendant did not manifest an intent to relin-
quish an expectation of privacy in his belongings, because of his efforts to "shield those
[belongings] from the gaze of others when he left them in the bridge abutment area dur-
ing the day." Id at 109, 588 A.2d at 159-60.
196. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
197. State v. Mooney, 218 Conn. 85, 109, 588 A.2d 145, 160, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
330 (1991).




a third party, as had the defendants in Greenwood.99 In its decision, the
Mooney court gave weight to the police's knowledge, at the time of the
search, that the defendant regarded the area as his home;2°° the court
also noted that a failure to recognize such an expectation of privacy as
reasonable would result in an unequal application of the laws to the rich
and the poor.2 °1 Finally, the Mooney court recognized that, although a
property right to exclude others affords an individual a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy, "one need not have an 'untrammeled power to admit
and exclude' in order to claim the protection of the fourth
amendment. 202
Thus, although the Supreme Court has recognized that the home is
accorded full fourth amendment protection because of the strong pri-
vacy-not property-interests associated with it, lower courts have not
consistently followed this lead. While some have recognized a legitimate
fourth amendment right in such a makeshift place as a tent,20 3 other
courts, such as the Tenth Circuit in United States v. Ruckman, 2 4 have
focused solely on the property interests involved.
D. Analysis of Homeless Cases
In general, the lower courts' application of the fourth amendment to
transient homes has been inconsistent and deficient. While some courts
focus exclusively on the property rights of the individual in question,
other courts only consider this as one factor in making the
determination.
The analysis used by the majority in United States v. Ruckman,20 5
finding that the defendant's status as a trespasser was dispositive of his
fourth amendment rights, is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence. First, by focusing on the defendants'
status as trespassers, the Tenth Circuit ignored the rejection of a prop-
erty-based analysis as prescribed by the Court in Katz.206 Indeed, as the
dissent in Ruckman noted,
failing to have a legal property right in the invaded place does not, ipso
facto, mean that no legitimate expectation of privacy can attach to that
place. If it did ... Katz would be nonsensical, for fourth amendment
protection would then, indeed, turn on a property right in the invaded
199. See id. at 110, 588 A.2d at 160.
200. See id. at 111, 588 A.2d at 160.
201. See id. at 112, 588 A.2d at 161.
202. Id. at 95-96, 588 A.2d at 153 (quoting Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990)
(overnight guest has reasonable expectation of privacy in host's home)); see also Chap-
man v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 618 (1961) (warrantless search of tenant's home
violated fourth amendment even though landlord can enter house for certain purposes).
203. See supra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
204. 806 F.2d 1471 (10th Cir. 1986).
205. Id.
206. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
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place.20 7
The Supreme Court has continued to reaffirm the principle that property
rights may be a factor to be considered, but are not controlling in fourth
amendment analysis. In Rakas v. Illinois,"8 the Court recognized that
while
one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all
likelihood have a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of this
right to exclude [,] [e]xpectations of privacy protected by the Fourth
Amendment, of course, need not be based on a common-law interest in
real or personal property, or on the invasion of such an interest. 209
Second, the Ruckman majority's reliance on the "open fields" doctrine
is misplaced.210 In Oliver v. United States,21' the Court held that "an
individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted
out of doors in fields," reasoning that an individual does not have an
expectation of privacy in an open field because "open fields do not pro-
vide the setting for those intimate activities that the Amendment is in-
tended to shelter from government interference or surveillance."'21 2 In
contrast, in Ruckman, the defendant's activities did not take place out of
doors, but in an enclosed cave. Additionally, because this cave had been
the defendant's home for eight months, was furnished with a bed and
other necessities, and was fully enclosed by the defendant's home-made
door,213 it did provide the "setting for those intimate activities" usually
associated with a home.
Moreover, lack of a legal right to exclude others should not per se bar
207. Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1477 (McKay, J., dissenting).
208. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
209. Id. at 143-44 n.12; see also United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980)
("While property ownership is clearly a factor to be considered in determining whether
an individual's Fourth Amendment rights have been violated, property rights are neither
the beginning nor the end of this Court's inquiry.") (citation omitted).
Some lower court decisions holding that a trespasser can not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy have based this finding on the Court's statement in Rakas that one
whose presence is "wrongful" has an expectation of privacy that society is not "prepared
to recognize as 'reasonable.'" Rakas, 439 U.S. at 144 n.12; see United States v. Pitt, 717
F.2d 1334, 1337-38 (1 1th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); United States v.
Sanchez, 635 F.2d 47, 64 (2d Cir. 1980). "Wrongful presence," however, was illustrated
by the Court in Rakas by the examples of an individual in a stolen car or "[a] burglar
plying his trade in a summer cabin during the off season." Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141 n.9,
143 n.12. Surely these examples are distinguishable from the presence of a trespasser or
squatter living in an abandoned building with the knowledge or acquiescence of the
owner. Furthermore, one of the cases relied on by the majority in Ruckman, People Y.
Sumlin, merely held that the casual guest of an employee of a squatter in a city-owned
building did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy there. See 105 Misc. 2d 134,
138, 431 N.Y.S.2d 967, 969-70 (Sup. Ct. 1980). The court, however, did recognize that
the squatter himself might have an expectation of privacy that is reasonable. See id. at
138 n.4, 431 N.Y.S.2d at 970 n.4.
210. See United States v. Ruckman, 806 F.2d 1471, 1473 (10th Cir. 1986).
211. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
212. Id. at 178, 179 (Powell, J., concurring).
213. See Ruckman, 806 F.2d at 1478 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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squatters from claiming rights under the fourth amendment. Although
some courts have denied fourth amendment rights to squatters because
they do not have the legal right to exclude others,21 4 the Supreme Court
in Minnesota v. Olson held that an "untrammeled power to admit and
exclude" is not a requisite for fourth amendment protection.215
Thus, of the cases decided to date, the best approach to analyzing the
fourth amendment rights of the homeless is the one taken by the
Supreme Court of Hawaii in State v. Dias.2" 6 Unlike the Tenth Circuit in
Ruckman, the Dias court did not find the squatters' status as trespassers
dispositive of the fourth amendment issue, but instead found it to be only
one factor to be considered in light of the surrounding circumstances.
Hence, although the defendants in Dias were trespassers, the court found
that because the government had allowed the squatters to stay on the
government land for a period of time, their presence was not "wrong-
ful" '2 17 and their expectation of privacy within the shack was legiti-
mate.218 Even so, the reasoning in Dias remains unsatisfactory. By
failing to consider the nature of the place investigated,21 9 the court in
Dias ignored a significant element of the Supreme Court's fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence.
Finally, the approach taken by the Supreme Court of Connecticut in
State v. Mooney,22° finding that closed containers within a makeshift
home were within the ambit of the fourth amendment, is useful for deter-
mining the scope of fourth amendment protection within the makeshift
home itself.221 The court, however, by declining to decide whether
Mooney had a reasonable expectation of privacy within the actual make-
shift home, did not go far enough in its analysis. As suggested below,
courts should instead look beyond the makeshift aspect of the "home"
and determine whether the factors that comprise a "reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy" are to be found in the makeshift home at issue.
III. PROPOSED STANDARD FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
OF THE HOMELESS
Because the homeless live in a wide variety of settings, there can be no
appropriate per se rule regarding their fourth amendment rights. In-
stead, the proper analysis must focus on the particular factual situation
of each case. Just as there is a continuum in the cases regarding what
constitutes a "reasonable expectation of privacy," so too does the wide
spectrum of homeless situations demand such an analysis.
214. See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
215. 495 U.S. 91, 99 (1990).
216. 62 Haw. 52, 609 P.2d 637 (1980); see supra notes 178-83 and accompanying text.
217. See supra note 209 (discussing "wrongful presence").
218. See Dias, 62 Haw. at 55, 609 P.2d at 640.
219. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text.
220. 218 Conn. 85, 588 A.2d 145, cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 330 (1991).
221. See supra notes 186-202 and accompanying text.
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This Part proposes a test to determine whether a particular homeless
individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Based on the
Supreme Court's fourth amendment jurisprudence discussed above, the
proposed standard suggests that courts should consider the following
four factors in making the determination of whether a homeless person
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a particular place: (1) the
treatment of the homeless by society in that locale; (2) whether the
homeless person took "normal precautions" under the circumstances to
maintain his privacy; (3) the uses to which the place in question was put,
including whether the area searched was used as a "home"; and (4)
whether the government conducted the search in a physically non-intru-
sive manner.
A. Custom and Practice in Community
In determining whether an expectation of privacy is one that society
would consider "reasonable," courts look to whether this expectation is
based on "understandings that are recognized and permitted by soci-
ety."' - While courts may use laws as a guide in determining what soci-
ety would consider as reasonable, they are not constrained by the scope
of these laws. The Supreme Court demonstrated this in California v.
Greenwood," where, although the applicable state law recognized a
right to privacy in one's garbage, the Court found that the countervailing
social practice of rummaging through garbage made the expectation of
privacy unreasonable. 4 Similarly, in Florida v. Riley," 5 a majority of
the court emphasized that although the police made their observations
from legal navigable airspace, the actual frequency of flights over the
petitioner's backyard played an important role in assessing whether that
person had an expectation that society would regard as reasonable." 6
Because the Court has thus recognized that local custom supersedes law
in a determination of what society would regard as reasonable, courts
assessing the fourth amendment rights of the homeless must look beyond
vhether the homeless individual in question had a legal right to be in his
or her location, and focus instead on the actual custom and practice of
treating the homeless by the community in question.
Therefore, in determining whether an expectation of privacy is one so-
ciety would regard as reasonable, courts should focus on the social cus-
tom of treating the homeless in the community in question. Just as the
222. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978); see also Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (person occupying a public telephone booth "assume[s] that the
words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world"); supra notes 55-
60 and accompanying text (discussing second prong of the Katz test).
223. 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
224. For a discussion of the Greenwood decision, see supra notes 123-35 and accompa-
nying text.
225. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
226. See supra notes 105-07, 114-20 and accompanying text.
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Court in Minnesota v. Olson227 held that the "longstanding social cus-
tom" of allowing people to stay overnight in one's home renders an over-
night guest's expectation of privacy reasonable, 228 so too does a
community's practice of allowing the homeless to live on public streets
demonstrate that those homeless people's expectation of privacy is one
that society would consider reasonable.
In many communities, members of the public implicitly recognize the
privacy of the homeless.229 Some members of the public do so by ignor-
ing the homeless and letting them continue to live in their makeshift
homes undisturbed, while others recognize their right to live on the
streets by bringing them food or actually assisting them in building their
homes. 230 Furthermore, in some localities, the authorities either tacitly
or explicitly condone the existence of homeless "abodes" by making no
effort to "sweep" the homeless despite anti-homeless laws, or by setting
aside certain areas in which the homeless may reside.231 If society re-
spects the privacy of the homeless in these makeshift shelters, it must
also respect their privacy in the context of a criminal investigation.
Thus, in communities where the public at large respects the privacy of
the homeless-despite the existence of laws denying the homeless these
rights-courts must find that a homeless person's expectation of privacy
is one society would consider reasonable.
On the other end of the spectrum, in some communities the police
make every effort to regularly "sweep" the public areas of its homeless
and their makeshift homes.232 In addition, the local authorities will
sometimes warn the homeless squatting on public land that their pres-
ence there is wrongful and will not be tolerated.233 In communities such
as these, an expectation of privacy in any makeshift home should-and
would likely-be found to be unreasonable.
In between these two extremes, of course, lies a variety of ways in
which the homeless may be treated by the community. For instance,
some homeless may be able to occupy the same locale for years, not be-
cause the local authorities or members of the public condone their pres-
ence, but because they have remained undiscovered. Courts should
analyze the circumstances of each particular case to ascertain where it
falls along the spectrum of possibilities. In addition, the factors de-
227. 495 U.S. 91 (1990).
228. Id. at 98.
229. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
230. See, e.g., Atlantans Build Huts, supra note 20 (discussing architects who build
huts for homeless on public and private property); Wilgoren, Reaching Out to the Home-
less, Wash. Post, June 28, 1990, at Ml, col. I (reporting on group of Washington, D.C.
residents who regularly dispense food and clothing to homeless in their makeshift
homes).
231. See supra notes 17-21, 178-83 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
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scribed below should help guide courts faced with cases involving the
homeless.
B. Normal Precautions
Precautions taken by an individual need only be "normal" in order to
merit fourth amendment protection.234 Moreover, requiring impenetra-
ble security in order to fall within the scope of the fourth amendment
would tend to deny this constitutional right to a whole class of people.
The homeless are, by definition, without a "home," and those homeless
who live in makeshift "homes" are in no position to outfit their homes
with foolproof security measures. Thus, compelling such impenetrable
security measures would mean, in effect, that homeless individuals as a
class would be per se barred from having any fourth amendment rights in
their makeshift homes.
Instead, courts should look at whether the inhabitant of the makeshift
abode took normal precautions under the circumstances to maintain his
privacy. Although these makeshift homes might not be completely invio-
lable, some are more accessible to the public than are others3 5 Courts
should consider such factors including, but not limited to, whether the
individual claiming fourth amendment protection made efforts to shield
the inside of the "home" from public view, whether the home was in an
area not well-travelled by the general public, and whether the makeshift
home was part of a community of makeshift homes in which the occu-
pants looked out for each other's belongings.236 Where these security
measures are taken, courts should lean toward greater fourth amendment
protection.
C. The Uses to Which the Place is Put
In its fourth amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court continu-
ally uses the "place" in which the activity occurred as an index in deter-
mining whether individuals could expect to have privacy.2 7  A
continuum appears in the cases with the home at one end (garnering the
highest amount of fourth amendment protection) and "open field" at the
other end (receiving no fourth amendment protection)."3 The Court de-
termines where on the continuum a certain place is located by focusing
on its connection to "'strong concepts of intimacy, personal autonomy
and privacy associated with the home.' "239
234. See supra note 57 accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text (describing safety advantages of
some homeless abodes).
236. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reference
to "place" in recent cases).
238. See Wilkins, supra note 62, at 1112.
239. Id. at 1113 (quoting Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 749 F.2d 307, 314 (6th Cir.
1984), afftd, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)); see also supra note 144 and accompanying text (dis-
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Accordingly, courts should take into consideration the uses to which
the homeless person has put the locality in question. Thus, if a particular
place is used as a "home" by an individual, the court should weigh this
factor in favor of finding that the expectation of privacy is reasonable.
Although there is no consitutional right to shelter, society often recog-
nizes the right of the homeless to find shelter for themselves in public
places. Where a homeless person uses his makeshift shelter as a home,
society would be more likely to find this expectation of privacy
reasonable.
If, on the other hand, the homeless individual is using the location for
purposes other than as a home, society would be less likely to find a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Although society recognizes as rea-
sonable the use of a location for shelter, society is less likely to find other
uses of areas by the homeless to be reasonable. For example, where an
individual is using an abandoned storefront solely for the purpose of sell-
ing drugs, society would not find this expectation of privacy to be reason-
able. Thus, only by taking "use" into account can courts accurately
determine whether the expectation of privacy is reasonable.
D. Physically Non-intrusive Manner
Although Katz eradicated the need for a trespass in order to find a
fourth amendment violation, the Supreme Court has recently noted that
the degree of physical intrusiveness of the investigation is a factor to be
considered. 2" Thus, whether the police use intrusive means to obtain
the evidence should also be considered by the courts. For instance, if the
police see or hear evidence without entering the makeshift abode, this
should weigh against the finding of a fourth amendment violation.241 On
the other hand, if the police obtain the evidence at issue by intruding in
any way into the homeless individual's makeshift home, courts should be
more likely to find that the fourth amendment rights of that individual
have been violated.
CONCLUSION
Since Katz, the determination of whether an individual's fourth
amendment rights have been violated does not depend on the property
rights of that person. Instead, the Supreme Court looks to a variety of
factors when deciding whether the expectation of privacy is one that soci-
ety would regard as reasonable. Lower courts, however, when applying
the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test to homeless people,
cussing the Court's holding that a mobile home merits less fourth amendment protection
than does a traditional home in California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)).
240. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451-52 (1989).
241. See, e.g., State v. Dias, 62 Haw. 52, 56, 609 P.2d 637, 640 (1980) (holding that
evidence obtained by police standing outside the squatters huts did not violate the fourth
amendment).
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often overlook some of these factors and focus, instead, on the property
rights of the individual.
In the spirit of both Katz and the Supreme Court's more recent fourth
amendment jurisprudence, the fourth amendment rights of a homeless
individual should not turn on his or her status as a homeless person lack-
ing property rights in the invaded place. Rather, courts must look at a
number of indicators to determine whether a particular homeless person
has an expectation of privacy that society would regard as reasonable.
Of particular relevance to the homeless is the treatment of them by the
community in question. The Supreme Court has emphasized the impor-
tance of local custom in its recent decisions and, because the treatment of
the homeless varies widely from community to community, courts must
look to actual custom in the given locality to ascertain whether the ex-
pectation of privacy claimed by the homeless person is "reasonable."
Where the public in the community at issue has respected the privacy of
the homeless for all other purposes or has tolerated the presence of
homeless in certain areas because it is expedient for them to do so, courts
should find that the expectation of privacy claimed by the homeless is
one society would consider reasonable. Put simply, if a community con-
dones the presence of the homeless on public streets for some purposes, it
would be grossly unjust for it to subsequently claim that the homeless
have no expectation of privacy for investigatory purposes.
The number of homeless in the United States is large and growing. To
deny fourth amendment protection to the homeless across the board
would deprive a whole class of citizens of a basic constitutional right.
Instead, courts should be flexible in their approach to this issue and rec-
ognize that the treatment of the homeless by their communities plays an
important part in assessing the fourth amendment rights of the homeless.
Finally, it must be conceded that recognizing a fourth amendment
right in a homeless person's makeshift home is not necessarily beneficial
to the homeless population in the long run. In some ways, by finding
that this right does exist, courts are acknowledging society's tacit accept-
ance of the continual daily existence of the homeless on our streets. Ulti-
mately, the only solution to the crisis of homelessness is to find housing
and jobs for those in need. Until then, however, courts must recognize
that the homeless' lack of a traditional "home" does not necessarily ex-
clude them from the protection of the fourth amendment, and should
consider the factors set forth above in making their determinations.
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